“It Ain’t that Complicated” — Applied Theological Hermeneutics VI

August 13, 2008

Do we need “authority” for what we believe and practice in the kingdom of God?

I think so. 

It seems that Jesus was concerned about that very question when he raised it with his inquisitors regarding the baptism of John.  “By what authority” seems to be a legitimate question (Matthew 23:23-27).  [Perhaps someone might quibble with my use of that text--I understand that, but I will leave the larger question to the side for the moment.  I will simply assume, for my present purposes, that disciples of Jesus need "authority" for what they believe and practice in the kingdom of God.]

Now the question is what do we mean by “authority”? What are we talking about? 

Limiting myself to the historic position among Churches of Christ on “biblical authority,” I want to discuss this point in the light of two variant approaches.

One answer might be something like this.  What disciples need for authority in the kingdom of God is positive law. In other words, to search out the rules and regulations which govern the church as if New Testament documents intended to fully set out a pattern for the church in terms of assembly, organization, etc. These rules, for example, are specific and exclude coordinates (not simply what contradicts the command, but what is coordinate to the command). The specific of bread and wine, for example, excludes any other food in addition to the bread and wine. The specific of singing excludes any addition to the singing (including humming, playing or handclapping, etc.). The specific of first day of the week Lord’s Supper excludes any other day. What is assumed is that each of these texts intend to be specific exclusionary commands. This is a process for discerning positive law, and it assumes a constitutional literary model, legal hermeneutics, isolation of texts from contexts in order to place them in a legal syllogistic frame, human inferences about “coordinates” and their nature, and the Reformed regulative principle among other things. I have critiqued this approach in my previous articles on hermeneutics, especially the series on Stone-Campbell Hermeneutics and this present series.

Another answer might be something like this.  What disciples need for authority in the kingdom of God is an organic connection or relationship with the gospel (the Christ Event). Jesus is the authority in the kingdom of God–the meaning and significance of his life, ministry, death, resurrection and ascension are the authority for disciples of Jesus. Whatever we do in the kingdom of God must be rooted, connected to and organically grow out of the Christ Event. It is fundamentally the imitation of Jesus, but more broadly the imitation of God (theocentric focus) who is revealed in Jesus and through redemptive history.

The problem with positive law is that we don’t have any instruction within the New Testament that fits the genre of a legal code in the New Testament.  The Christ Event is the core message of the New Testament and the theological reality which is the hermeneutical lens for Paul (as an example).  If you have read my previous posts on hermeneutics, you can understand why I think the ”Christ Event” rather than “positive law” is the root of authority in the kingdom of God. 

Authority derives climatically from the mighty act of God in Jesus whose significance has been lived out in Israel previously and the church subsequently. Authority in the kingdom of God is not about legal propositions but authentic revelation of the heart of God in Jesus.

But how does this work? Those within Churches of Christ are quite familiar with how positive law functions within a paradigm of command, example and inference that assumes a legal pattern for the church within the New Testament. But authority derived from the act of God in Jesus does not resonate well with those trained in the legal hermeneutic of positive law.  Consequently, I will briefly illustrate what I mean by this.

Those who know my writings know that I have spent quite a bit of time and used quite a bit of space talking about the sacraments or ordinances of the gospel (Baptism, Lord’s Supper and–I would add–Assembly).

The practice and meaning of these sacramental moments is derived from the Christ Event rather than a positive law. This was part of my purpose in my “sacramental triology” on Baptism, Lord’s Supper and Assembly.

Baptism. Disciples follow Jesus into the water.  They commit themselves, as Jesus did, to the ministry of the kingdom through their baptism. They are declared children of God at their baptism. They are gifted with the Holy Spirit to minister at their baptism.  Jesus is the model of baptism; his baptism is the first Christian baptism. As disciples of Jesus, we commit ourselves to the way of the cross through baptism just as he did.

Israel anticipated this purification act through their own water rituals and the early church continued the water ritual of baptism as initiation into the community, participation in the gospel, and anticipation of the eschaton.

Lord’s Supper. Disciples follow Jesus to the table. They continue the table ministry of Jesus through the breaking of bread–eating with sinners and saints, Pharisees and prostitutes. At the table, Jesus breaks the bread, communes with us, and we enjoy the fellowship of the kingdom.  But the table is characterized by kingdom etiquette–it welcomes the poor, the oppressed, the wealthy, sick, etc. At the table we sit as servants together in the kingdom of God and declare the gospel in word and deed.

Israel anticipated this table fellowship through the thanksgiving (fellowship) offerings of the Levitical system which was a daily event in Israel and part of every festival.  The early church continued breaking bread with Jesus and each other, both daily and every first day of the week. The practice of the table was declaration of the gospel, a participation in the gospel, and an anticipation of the eschaton.

Assembly. Disciples follow Jesus into the assembly of God’s people.  Jesus assembled with the people of God to declare the praise of God, and he calls us to gather together in his name to pray. He is present with us, joins in our chorus of praise to the Father, and by the presence of the Spirit transforms us into his image.

Israel anticipated the assembly of God’s people with Jesus through their own assemblies in the presence of God (Leviticus 23) as their festivals were sacred moments of encounter between God and his people.  The early church continued the practice of assembling for prayer as well as mutual encouragement, but it was not simply for encouragement but also to meet with Jesus and enter the Holy of Holies as a community. Assembling is a witness of the gospel, a participation in the gospel, and an anticipation of the eschaton.

Thus, disciples seek “authority” in the life, ministry, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus rather than in prescriptive rules and regulations that are embedded in a legal constitution. We seek authority in the story of God among his people so that we might participate in that story, imitate the life of God in that story, and become the image of God in the world rather than finding a pattern (which we have to construct because it is not explicitly there) in order to build our congregations like Moses built the tabernacle.

I know that there are many other hermeneutical issues to consider.  I have made a feeble, fallible and flawed attempt to think through some of the issues of hermeneutical method.  I hope it is beneficial to some and at least food for thought to all.

Now I take leave for a few days to watch the Cubs in Atlanta as the eschaton is on the horizon with the Cubs in first place!  :-)

Shalom,

John Mark


“It Ain’t That Complicated” — Applied Theological Hermeneutics II

August 6, 2008

In this post I will consider the use of 1 Corinthians 16:1-4 among Churches of Christ as a legal prescription or pattern for weekly giving as an act of worship in the Sunday assembly. My purpose is to illustrate the use of the CEI hermeneutic to establish biblical authority. In my next few posts I will offer an alternative hermeneutical approach.

Stone-Campbell Historical Perspective

Alexander Campbell, like many British dissenters before him and even John Calvin himself, believed Acts 2:42 provided a guideline for Christian assemblies. He identified “the fellowship” as the sharing of monetary resources (or, the contribution). In his Christian Baptist series on the “Restoration of the Ancient Order of Things” he authors only one article on “The Fellowship” (January 2, 1826, 209-211). “The contribution,” Campbell writes, “the weekly contribution–the distribution to the poor saints, we contend is a part of the religion of Jesus Christ.” He bases this conclusion on 1 Corinthians 16:1-4: “That every christian congregation should follow the examples of those which were set in order by the apostles, is, I trust, a proposition which few of those who love the founder of the christian institution, will question. And that the apostles did give orders to the congregations in Galatia and to the Corinthians to make a weekly contribution for the poor saints, is a matter that cannot be disputed.”

While Campbell believed “the contribution” was an apostolic institution, he did not think his version of the “Restoration of the Ancient Order of Things” should be used “as a test of christian character or terms of christian communion” (Christian Baptist, September 3, 1827, 370). He thought it was apostolic practice, but it was not a test of fellowship.

In contrast to Campbell’s attitude, between 1865-1875 a legal attitude developed regarding worship activities in the assembly based on the notion of “positive law.”  In 1870, H. Turner asked the question “Does the New Testament determine the elements of the public worship?” His answer was that there are “five public acts of worship” (the first time I have seen that phrase in Stone-Campbell literature): teaching, fellowship, breaking bread, prayers, and singing (Christian Quarterly, January 1870, 250-258). This became an exclusive and required list because “in all acts of worship, we must do only what is prescribed in the New Testament” (Moses Lard, “True Worship of God,” Lard’s Quarterly 4 [October 1867], 395). “The original worship, in all of its items,” Benjamin Franklin wrote, “must be maintained or all is lost” (“Distinctive Plea,” American Christian Review 14 [5 December 1871], 388).  The “five acts of worship”–without subtraction or addition–became a legal test of a faithful Sunday assembly. It was, apparently, all or nothing in terms of worshipping in “spirit and truth.”

In 1865 Albert Allen wrote a landmark article for Lard’s Quarterly (“The Contribution,” October 1864, 64-72) in which he articulated a clear hermeneutic for the contribution as a prescribed weekly act of worship in the assembly. Acts 2:42 suggested to Allen that the contribution was apostolic practice.  Consequently, “we may presume,” Allen wrote, “to find some law regulating the observance of this duty, and the object for which done” (my emphasis; p. 69).  [Did anyone hear the Reformed reguative principle in that statement?] Allen presumes that if it was an apostolic practice, then it must have specific legal regulations. Why would he presume that? Because the Baconian method, the Regulative principle, and a constitutional literary model demanded that every practice have some legal regulations. Consequently, since he saw 1 Corinthians 16:1-4 as that regulatory text, he identified the laws of giving as: 

  1. That it must be done on every first day of the week.
  2. That the amount thus obtained was to be put into the treasury of the church.
  3. That each ought to give as he was prospered of the Lord

George Austen, in a follow-up article on “The Contribution” (Lard’s Quarterly [April 1865], 264), suggested that the “laws which govern” the contribution must identify “time, place, circumstance.”  These are:

  1. On the first day of the week (every week).
  2. When assembled with the church.
  3. As the Lord has prospered the worshiper.

In addition, Austen understood this “fixed law of God” as intended for the “wants of the poor and the furtherance of the gospel” (p. 265).

If God intended the contribution as an “act of worship,” according to the hermeneutical presuppositions, then somewhere Scripture must regulate this. Consequently, Bible study meant searching Scripture for the “regulations” or “laws” that governed this act of worship.  Identifying the act of worship in Acts 2:42, Allen and Austen found the regulative laws in 1 Corinthians 16:1-2. If this text does not regulate the contribution, then no text does and it becomes an unauthorized act to take up money in the assembly on Sunday because every act of worship in the assembly needs prescriptive authority…so the argument goes. Since congregations take up a contribution, and everyone agrees that this is a good thing, then there must be prescriptive authority for it and regulatory guidelines somewhere in the New Testament concerning it!

During the 1870s the segment of the Stone-Campbell Movement  ultimately identified as “Churches of Christ” became solidified in their understanding of the “five acts of worship” as an exclusive legal requirement for faithful churches. The weekly contribution is one of those acts and without such an act in the weekly assembly there is no true worship. A church must have a weekly contribution to remain faithful and keep their candlestick in the presence of Jesus.

God, then, has specificed when, who, and how  we should support the financial needs of the kingdom of God.  But did he specify for what?  Well, that becomes quite controversial among Churches of Christ in the 20th century.

The Pattern Argument

Roy Deaver, “The Corinthian Collection–God’s Financial Plan for His Church,” in Studies in 1 Corinthians, ed. Dub McClish (Denton, TX: Pearl Street Church of Christ, 1982), 263-71) provides a good example of the pattern argument from 1 Corinthians 16:1-4. There are, of course, many other examples of this argument.

Deaver’s presuppositions are important.  In 1 Corinthians 16:1-4, “Paul (inspiration) sets out God’s financial plan for his (God’s) churches. These instructions were not given for the Corinthan brethren only” as 1 Corinthians 4:17 states that Timothy will remind the Corinthians about his “ways which are in Christ, even as” Paul teaches “everywhere in every church” (p. 264).  The argument, then, is that whatever Paul taught the Corinthians, he taught every church.  Whatever is taught every church is normative for all churches throughout history. Therefore, every congregation today must collect money during the Sunday weekly assembly.

The assumption is that what Paul teaches in 1 Corinthians 16:1-4 is what he teaches in “every church.” Interesting, is it not, that he had not previously taught the Corinthians about it until this letter and then only in response to a question from the Corinthians (“now concerning…”)? They had to ask a question about the collection of money, but if Paul had previously taught the Corinthians his “ways” (Timothy was to remind them) then they should have already known.  Apparently, “God’s financial plan” was not part of the “ways” that Paul was talking about, that is, it was not part of what Paul taught in every church.

Deaver argues tht Paul commanded a specific arrangement–on every first day of the week every person (or family unit) must contribute to the church treasury (“treasuring up” or “storing up”) according to how God has prospered them.  “This is God’s plan for financing his work. God’s plan is the best plan, and God’s plan is the only right plan” (p. 269).

The text is explicitly occasional and specific–a collection for churches in Judea from Gentile churches (Galatia and Achaia–it does not include Macedonia). It appears as an expedient arrangement in the context of Paul’s third missionary journey. Indeed, it seems Paul introduces a new practice in response to a question from the Corinthians about how to proceed with the collection. It may be that there were no other churches practicing this and it appears that the Galatians and Corinthians were not practicing it prior to the instruction. There is also considerable ambiguity in the text about what it means to “store up” (treasury or putting personal money aside?) and where (home or assembly?). The verb understood as “command” by Deaver has more the force of setting up an arrangement (e.g., do it this way or putting things in a particular order) rather than an imperative that derives from the nature of things (or the character of God).  If it is a command for all churches, why are the Macedonians not included in this arrangement (2 Corinthians 8:1-5), and–in fact–he does not intend to command the Corinthians at all (2 Corinthians 8:8).

Hermeneutical Questions

But let’s grant the exegesis offered by Deaver, that is, corporate weekly Sunday giving into a common fund for the poor in Jerusalem.  While I exegetically tend to favor this understanding, it is not certain; there are some ambiguities in the text (e.g., did they put it aside at home or was it given in an assembly).   Rather, I want to raise some questions about the hermeneutical use of this text to construct a pattern.

Broadly, the argument assumes that everything Paul “commands” Corinth is something he commanded all of the congregations he planted. It further assumes that everything he commands Corinth (and every other congregation he planted) is normative for every congregation in the history of the church, including congregations today.  In other words, it is the Texas two-step–Paul commands X, therefore we do X.

More specifically, the use of this text within patternistic constructionism illustrates how one discerns the pattern, including the limits and boundaries of the patternl and how complicated that process is. Indeed, it is a process that would be unavailable to the Corinthians themselves when the read their own letter since they would not have the full resources that the hermeneutic demands in order to discern the pattern in the text.

1.  Is the purpose for which the church gave an exclusive one?  This collection was for the poor saints in Jerusalem. Should Sunday contributions be limited to such since this is all that is specified in this authorizing text?  One might say that this is a specific application of a generic principle, that is, the church may use this method in order to meet any legitimate need and is not necessarily limited to this specific need (cf. Guy N. Woods, Open Forum, 1976, p. 356).  The legitimate need would thus expand to include buildings, ministerial salaries, janitorial staff, landscaping, international evangelistic work, etc. Here is where the complexity arises. One must decide what is generic and what is specific because within the hermeneutic whatever is intentionally specific is exclusive of all other coordinating particulars (e.g., “sing” excludes “play” because “play” is a coordinate of “sing” under the generic category of “music”). So, what is specific and what is generic in this text? What does the generic include? How does one identify the generic? How does one determine “legitimate need” according to the pattern?

A result of this discussion has been divisions over whether to use church funds to put a kitchen in the building, whether to support full-time preachers, whether to building gyms, whether to fund social/recreational activities, etc. Churches have divided over those issues as they attempted to discern the “pattern” inherent in 1 Corinthians 16:1-4.

2.  Is the contribution into the common fund something exclusive to Sunday? The text specifies the first day of the week and reading it within the context of the epistle there is no other time specified. Is the “contribution” as an act of public worship is limited to Sunday only in much the same way that the Lord’s Supper–based on one text in Acts 20:7 (the only text that identifies the specific day as “first day of the week”)–is limited to Sunday only for many within Churches of Christ? Here is where the complexity arises.  The contribution is not limited to Sunday if one can find examples or infer principles from other texts within the New Testament that one might also take up a contribution on other days of the week.  Consequently, 1 Corinthians 16:1-4 does not limit giving to Sunday because there are other examples or principles that negate such a restriction while Acts 20:7 limits the Lord’s Supper to Sunday because there are no other examples or principles that negate that restriction. But is there any clear, explicit example in the New Testament of Christians giving on any day other than Sunday? Even if there was, this would not have been available to the Corinthian readers and apparently Paul had not taught them about “timing” previous to this text.

While it has not been a common point, I have heard it argued on occasion that churches should not take up a collection on Wednesday evening because it belongs only to Sunday (my father was one of these at one point in his life). I have heard objections to missionaries taking up collections, for example, on a Wednesday evening because there is no authority in the New Testament for the church to do such a thing except on Sunday. I have even experienced the compromise that a collection would be taken up after the closing prayer of the Wednesday evening service so that it would be “officially” an act of public worship but a contribution by individuals.  Given the patternist concern and their deep conviction to be biblical, I understand their point! Unfortunately, those who do not know the “common sense” method, think the whole discussion is frivolous.

3.  Is a free will offering the only way a Christian may give to the common fund?  To put it another way, are other forms of fundraising excluded by this specific injunction in 1 Corinthians 16:1-4? Does this specific exclude all other forms of collecting money? Again, the complexity rests in the nature of the specific/generic construction.  Is this free will offering on Sunday a specific of a broader generic (e.g., Corinth, like Galatia, should raise money this way but it does not mean it is the only way to do it) or is it a specific that excludes any other coordinate fundraising method? The method proposes that if there are not other examples of fundraising then the silence regarding other methods verifies the exclusivity of this method.

This, too, has divided churches and created aggitation within congregations.  May the Youth Group conduct a car wash to raise money for a mission trip or to feed hungry children?  May a Bible Class host a Yard Sale on the church parking lot to supplement the church budget? May a church buy a house and then sell it for a profit to supplement their budget? May a church put their money in a CD to earn interest on their money?

4.  Must Christians give every week? If the text is a legal prescription, then Christians must give every week in the assembly.  They cannot use bank drafts (because it is not in the assembly), or give monthly, or give annually.   We might say that they give as they have been prospered and if they are paid monthly, then they give monthly.  But this does not fit the specifics of the text itself–it “commands” the Christians to give every week in the Sunday assembly. Is the specific indeed a real specific that excludes other alternatives (monthly, annually, etc.) or is a generic principle that includes other alternatives? The complexity of the hermeneutic forces us into another seemingly frivolous discussion.

While I have not known any church divisions over this point, I have it heard it passionately discussed. It is the fruit of the hermeneutic that whether a believer gives to his congregation annually, monthly, bi-weekly or weekly becomes a point of passionate contention about worshipping in “spirit and truth.”

Perspectives

My point in this post is not to offer an alternative reading of 1 Corinthians 16:1-4.  Rather, it is to understand the presuppositions, assumptions, particular exegetical decisions, and the complexity of the process by which Churches of Christ have generally concluded that:

Every Christian ought to contribute weekly to the common fund (treasury) of their local congregation, every congregation ought to take up a weekly contribution as part of their Sunday assembly as an act of worship necessary for faithful assembling (worshipping in “spirit and truth”), free will offerings are the only legitimate method for raising money for the common fund of the congregation, and the common fund is only for the legitimate needs of the church’s life and ministry.

I wonder if Paul had all that in mind when he penned 1 Corinthians 16:1-4. (And there are still questions unanswered–how do we determine a “legitimate need,” for example?) The CEI method–seeking a pattern, determining the nature of what we must find, and applying conceptual distinctions to the text that are alien to it–forces Paul to say this.

Ultimately, the method (regulative principle, CEI, Baconianism, constitutional literary model, etc.) decides not only what the apostles practiced, but also determines for Scripture what it must tell us about what they practiced.  If they practiced “fellowship,” then Scripture must tell how, when, for what, and where they practiced it so that we might legally conform to the pattern in the text. We presume Scripture must do this because we read Scripture as Baconian hermeneuters through the lens of a constitutional literary model. In other words, the method tells Scripture what Scripture must provide.  And if we go to Scripture expecting to find X (when, for what, where, and how), we will probably find it, even if it is not there.

At bottom, the method abuses Paul’s words and makes him say something he did not say.

Is there a better way of reading and applying those words?  I think so…but that is for the next couple of posts.  This one is already too long.

 


Theological Hermeneutics X — “Texas Two-Step” or What?

July 4, 2008

Is the hermeneutical move from Scripture to application a “Texas Two-Step” or something else?

Two or Three?

By “Texas Two-Step” I do not mean the country/western dance that moves in sync with 4/4 time.  :-)  I am referring to the basic hermeneutical practice of moving from Scripture to application in “two steps.”

  1. Step One:  The text says “X”
  2. Step Two:  Therefore, we do “X”

This hermeneutic serves a form of restorationism that seeks to reduplicate the New Testament church just as it appears in the New Testament. Do what they did; it is the “safe” way to restore the church. They did “X” (the text says), and therefore we must do “X” (according to hermeneutical and patternistic assumptions). I regard this as a kind of naive primitivism which no one really practices but is nevertheless the rhetoric of Churches of Christ in the 20th century.

But it was never that simple. As we saw with Baconian induction/deduction, it has been far more complicated than that within the heritage of the Stone-Campbell Movement. Indeed, J. D. Thomas’ We Be Brethren laid out the principles for generic/specific, inclusion/exclusion, etc. The rules for understanding the nature of prohibitive silence, laws of exclusion, binding examples, implied commands, etc. are not explicit in the text itself but involve a process of discernment by which we decide in which cases we will do “X” just like Corinth (or Rome or Jerusalem, etc.) did “X” and where we will not do “X” just as they did (e.g., covered heads). In other words, there was always an intermediate third step.

  1. Step One:  The text says “X1″ and “X2″
  2. Step Two:  “X1″ is something intended for the church universal but “X2″ is not.
  3. Step Three: Therefore, we must do “X1″ but ”X2″ is optional.

Step two is the essence of “theological hermeneutics.”  It is a theological step. It is a process by which contemporary readers of Scripture discern the normativity of ethics and ecclesial practices in order to become the community God intended in creation and will bring to fullness in the Eschaton. Step two is about theology, that is, the substance that arises out of the metanarrative that forms us into the image of Christ.

Within Stone-Campbell hermeneutics this middle step is often hidden and sometimes even denied. Nevertheless, it is present in every hermeneutical conclusion.  For example, Churches of Christ have concluded that Scripture mandates that the Lord’s Supper be eaten every first day of the week and only on the first day of the week.  But Scripture never explicitly says this. Rather, we proceed with a multi-step method to get there.

  1. Step One:  The church in Troas ate the Supper on the first day of the week (Acts 20:7).
  2. Step Two:  Assumptions–(a) Troas did this every first day of the week [Paul waited seven days, right?--and certainly not because that is when the ship left. right?]; (b) the text functions to exclude other times because it records this occasion [what it does not include it excludes]; (c) there are no other texts which indicate a specific time for eating the Supper [denying Acts 2:46 or the Lord's on institution of the Supper on Thursday evening apply to the question]; (d) Troas’ eating assumes an implied command to eat on the first day of the week [though no such command appears anywhere in the New Testament]; (e) since the Supper is commanded, there must be somewhere in Scripture where we are told when to eat [thus dictating what Scripture must tell us, and if it must tell us, then we will find it!], etc.
  3. Step Three: Therefore, faithful churches eat the Supper only on the first day of the week and every first day of the week.

It is important to note the nature of Step Two in this example.  Here Step Two applies legal reasoning as if the text is a legal genre. It does not involve a theological reflection on the fact that Troas ate the Supper on the first day of the week and neither does it read Acts 20:7 within the Luke-Acts narrative. Rather, it treats the event as a legal precedent and thus Step Two functions as a legal rationale with a legal hermeneutic.  But Acts is not a legal document; it is a narrative. Step Two, in this case, violates the simple reading of the text in straight-forward grammatical-historical fashion as a narrative. The traditional hermeneutic actually complicates the text rather than simplifying it. The complexity of the traditional hermeneutic is actually quite astonding once one engages the discussions that have surrounded CEI and its applications (how many cups at the table? are Bible classes authorized? the complexities of the instrumental music discussion in terms of generic/specific and expedience/element distinctions, etc.).

This does not mean that all intermediate steps within Churches of Christ were purely legal. Sometimes there is theological reflection and sometimes there is cultural discernment (e.g., most Churches of Christ don’t require covered heads when women [silently] pray in the assembly). But when it comes to ecclesial practices, it usually is a matter of legal reasoning based on hidden hermeneutical and theological assumptions about the role of positive law in the Christian faith, the nature of Scripture as a legal (constitutional) document, and the function of Scripture to provide “legal authority.”

An Alternative Second Step

When approaching a particular text in Scripture, I suggest an explicit and self-aware ”three-step” hermeneutical method.  Again, “steps” are pedagogical devices and not timeless rules. And the number “three” is not sacred either (except in terms of Trinity!). In fact, we can make the three steps into fifty, I suppose.  Yet, I think there are two basic moves:  from (1) text to (2) theology, and then (2) theology to (3)application.  Below I proffer a possible way of thinking through a text theologically along with a simple example (which could be pursued in much greater depth than I do here) that dovetails with my previous post on methodology.

 

Three-Step Method

 

         Step 1:  The Affirmations of the Text:  Exegesis.

                  Contextualized Significance:  What did the text call them to do?

                  Contextualized Meaning:  Why did the text call for this behavior?

 

         Step 2:  Normative Substance of the Text:  Theology.

                  Theological Substance:  What theological substance inheres within the text’s meaning?

                  Redemptive-History:  How is this substance reflected within the theodrama?

                  Theological Center:  How does it cohere with the theological centers of the theodrama?

 

         Step 3:  Application of Meaning to Modern Audience:  Homiletics.

                  Recontextualized Meaning:  How does this substance translate into contemporary culture?

                  Recontextualized Significance:  What does the theology of the text call us to do?

 

Example Text:  1 Timothy 2:9-10.

            I also want women to dress modestly, with decency and propriety, not with braided hair or gold or pearls or expensive clothes, but with good deeds, appropriate for women who profess to worship God.

 

Step 1:  The Affirmations of the Text:  Exegesis.

 

Contextualized Significance:  What did the text call them to do?  Women should dress with “decency and propriety” which means they should not wear clothing that is ostentatious or reflects their noble status.  The context is probably a worship assembly, or at least, the lifestyle of the Christian community.

 

Contextualized Meaning:  Why did the text call for this behavior?  Women ought to give evidence of their piety (theosebeian) through good works rather than through their social standing.

 

Step 2:  Normative Substance of the Text:  Theology.

 

Theological Substance:  What theological substance inheres within the text’s meaning? The substance is humility/service as the proper evidence of one’s piety.

 

Redemptive-History:  How is this substance reflected within the theodrama?  The problem is not expensive clothing per se, or attention to beauty,  but the attitude which divides people according to class and social status.  The principles of redemptive-history reflect the union of God’s people in humility rather than along the lines of social standing  (cf. Amos 4:1-3; 6:1-7).  Arrogance translates into social injustice and luxurious lifestyles (Ezek. 16:49-50; James 5:5).

 

Theological Center:  How does it cohere with the theological centers of the theodrama? Fear of God and humility are paired in Scripture (cf. Prov. 15:33; 22:4).  Humility versus pride is a dominant theme in Scripture (Prov. 3:34; 11:1; James 4:6; 1 Peter 5:5).  The basic attitude of worship is humility (Is. 66:2; James 4:10; 1 Peter 5:6). It is the recognition that we creatures rather than the Creator, and as creatures we share the task of imaging God in the world. We see in Jesus himself the display of humility and service rather than pride and luxury.

 

Step 3:  Application of Meaning to Modern Audience:  Homiletics.

 

Meaning Recontextualized:  How does this substance translate into contemporary culture?  The Christian lifestyle must be a humble one (shall we say “simple” one?), and in the context of the worship assembly humble dress is demanded.  Issues of economic lifestyle and modest dress are culturally relative.  The theological substance, however, rejects pride and extravagance among God’s people.   

 

Significance Recontextualized:  What does the theology of the text call us to do?  It calls us to dress and live humbly in whatever cultural setting in which we find ourselves.  What does this mean for American churches and Christians? Anyone dare go there in their leadership within a church? Can we really hear the call of this text in our own setting? Dare we obey it?

 

This is a fairly simple illlustration though it is not without questions itself.  For example, is the theological principle really about humility/service where the problem was the ostentatious dress of women in Ephesus or is the problem more about seductive dress (the accessories of prostitutes)? Perhaps we don’t have to choose since either flows from the fundamental notion of “modesty.”

 

More importantly, this text illustrates that our modern applications do not always reproduce the Pauline application. Paul’s application excluded gold and braided hair from godly female dress, but we certainly don’t exclude such today (e.g., wedding rings).  I don’t think this is a problem.  Rather, it reflects the point that what we apply to the modern believer is not the text itself (“don’t wear gold”) but what we apply is the theological substance of the text (e.g., modesty, humility, service). The applications may vary according to circumstances, cultures and time, but the substance remains the same. And the substance remains the same because it is rooted in the theological reality of God himself revealed within in the theodrama.

 

What’s the Point?

 

If, in practice, everyone does at least a three-step, is not everyone following the same hermeneutical method?

 

Actually, no.  For my purpose, the significant difference between the traditional Stone-Campbell hermeneutic (the “hidden” three-step) and what I have proposed above is the substance of the second step.  While the traditional hermeneutic basically construes the second step as a legal maneuver in order to discern legal authority through a legal hermeneutical lens, I suggest we see the second step with a theodramatic lens.  In other words, instead of seeking “legal authority,” we are seeking how to participate in the theodrama in ways that embody the divine intent and goal.

 

In essence, I am suggesting metanarrative theology is the substance of the second step rather than constitutional law. The theological hermeneutic is to discern the character and mission of God through the theodrama as it culminates in the Christ Event. This discernment, then, enables us to recontextualize that theological substance for our contemporary world.

 

Why Such a Long Series?

 

My intent is not to be original. Indeed, I have learned much from others, and I believe that in many ways this is how Paul himself, for example, read Scripture. He read it with the lens of theological substance through the prism of Christ. [Perhaps I need a series on that to illustrate my point?]

 

I have often heard the critical barb that while many spend their time in deconstructing the traditional hermeneutic (CEI), nothing is ever offered in its place.  I don’t think this is accurate.  What it reflects is that the only hermeneutic that is deemed legitimate is the one the critics already practice or will reach the same conclusions that they cherish (e.g., any hermeneutic which does not conclude that instrumental music is sinful can’t be right).  Anything else, of course, is not as simple, not as coherent, not as practical, etc.  Anything else is not a hermeneutic at all.

 

This is unfortunate. I believe many writers such as Tom Olbricht (cf. Hearing God’s Voice) or C. Leonard Allen (Cruciform Church, especially the new edition) have offered hermeneutical alternatives.  They are not CEI–and that is the problem in the eyes of critics–but they do offer a way of reading Scripture that moves away from the Baconian assumptions of CEI as taught and practiced by traditional Churches of Christ.

 

So, my point in this series as been to offer an alternative–a way to read Scripture theologically.  My formulation is not set in stone; I’m still thinking about parts of it.  I have written this rather hurriedly as a daily discipline.  It is not perfect.  But it is, I think, suggestive of a better alternative.

 

Shall we read Scripture as constitutional law through legal hermeneutical criteria for Step Two?  Or, shall we read Scripture as a theodrama which calls us to participate in the story in ways that image God? Which, in fact, is more coherent with the nature of Scripture itself, Scripture’s own self-description, and its own language? Which one is more biblical?  Which one is more faithful to the nature of Scripture itself? 

 

I’ve given you my answer.  You will have to answer for yourself.

 

In my concluding hermeneutical series–to come shortly after I take a break from this topic–I will attempt to illustrate the method that I have advocated in this series.  In other words, finally, I will get practical.  :-)

 

Shalom

 

John Mark


Theological Hermeneutics IX — Outline of a Method

July 3, 2008

Okay, maybe I’m not ready to go with the intensely practical as yet….my bad!  But I think the following methodological outline of a theological hermeneutic is a fairly simple one.   I will wait for the “rubber-meets-the-road” kind of ecclesiological discussions of the theological hermeneutic (which is, historically, what really interests the heirs of the Stone-Campbell Movement) for my next series.  But we are drawing closer to a fuller explanation of the kind of theological hermeneutic I have in mind.

In one sense I don’t like “steps” (except when climbing a steep slope) because they tend to oversimplify an integrated process or they mechanize a dynamic process. Nevertheless, they are useful as a pedagogical device (which is the origin of Walter Scott’s five-finger exercise: Believe, Repent, Be Baptized, Remission of Sins, Gift of the Holy Spirit). But, we must remember, the steps should not be disconnected but rather seen as an organic process; steps that reciprocally shape each other–more like a spiral than a staircase.

Step One: The Theological Drama Within Scripture

We read Scripture through the lens of its fundamental theological drama which, of course, we only know through reading Scripture, living within the community of faith, and listening to the story of the church’s faith (e.g., The Rule of Faith).

Thus, we begin with the basic metanarrative of Scripture–the drama of God creating his good cosmos, pursuing his rebellious people, redeeming his broken cosmos, and consummating his redemptive purpose in the Escahton through Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit. This is our theological frame for reading Scripture and it is the frame that has shaped our reading of Scripture through the consensus theology of the church summarized in the “Rule of Faith” (Irenaeus’ version is available in his Against Heresies 1.10.1) or “Apostle’s Creed.”

It is important to note that the Apostle’s Creed is little more than a summary of the baptismal confessions of early Christians in the second and third centuries. It is a credo(“I believe”) that acknowledges the Creator God, the divine presence in Israel through the prophets, the Christ Event (birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension), and the pouring out of the Holy Spirit to form a community of redeemed people awaiting the resurrection and eternal life. It is a summary of the biblical theodrama.

This metanarrative reveals the theocentric nature of the drama, the Christocentric means of its accomplishment, and the pneumatological mode of its application. In essence, it reveals the character of God and the involvement of God in the comos. These are the theological baselines for any reflection on the Christian faith with the intent of living out the story of God in our present world. The metanarrative is the ultimate commitment and criterion for ecclesial faith and practice.

Step Two: Textual Affirmation as Guide

What Scripture affirms is our guide. We certainly read it with theological commitments and a dramatic frame that we have received through the Rule of Faith, but it is also something we read with an eye toward deepening, adjusting, correcting, or interpreting that Rule of Faith. Scripture–as the original interpretation of God’s mighty acts–is the norming norm though we read it in continual dialogue with the Rule of Faith as well as the continuing tradition of the church.

A. Historical-Grammatical Exegesis.  This category covers lots of ground. It includes the simple reading of the text by children as well as the complex reading of the text by scholars of Hebrew and Greek. 

At one level, what the text affirms serves as an empirical boundary for understanding. There are elements in the text that are as “objectively there” as the tree in my front yard.  For example, Jesus of Nazareth lived and died. To deny the text affirms this is as unrealistic as to deny that there is a tree in my front yard. For more on this point, see my series “Created for Hermeneutics” on my Serial Index page, particularly post III.

At another level, what the text affirms is accessible to readers whether scholars or not. “The Rule of Faith,” for example, is something readers may discern as a summary of what the text affirms. “Scholarship” is unnecessary at this level.  It is a matter of reading the text, believing what it affirms and doing it. Believers through the ages have lived out the meaning of God’s story through spiritual and “common sense” readings of Scripture. “Scholarship”–in the sense of post-Enlightenment critical thought–is not necessary to believe and participate in the theodrama (as long as there is a translated text available :-) ).

At a further level, historical-grammatical exegesis as a “scholarly” discipline (with different levels of expertise or utilization; e.g., some know Greek and some do not, but they may all seek a “historical and grammatical” understanding of the text) helps us understand Scripture through the eyes of the original readers of the text. This gives us some guide for affirming what the text affirms and cuts away some of the accretions of tradition heaped on top of a text as well as recognizing how texts can be ripped from their context for the sake of polemics (e.g., “proof-texting”). The goal of this reading of Scripture is to focus on what the text actually affirms in its historical and grammatical setting rather than what it might appear to say if we read it as if it appeared in our daily newspaper in our own historical setting (e.g., “covered heads” in 1 Corinthians 11 would mean something entirely different in Roman Corinth than it would in Dearborn, Michigan).

A Baconian inductivist/deductivist reading, however, tends to read the Bible atomistically, flattens the text, and treats it more like a textbook than ancient history. In other words, it actually undermines a grammatical-historical reading of the text. This recontextualizes Scripture so that the text is made to affirm something it did not affirm and deduce “truths” which it never intended to teach. In essence, while clearly accessing biblical truth at one level, when it reconstitutes that truth by reading the text through the grid of its Baconian inductivist/deductivist reasoning, it sometimes denies what the text actually affirms.

B. Redemptive-Historical Reading.  This is a canonical reading of Scripture which recognizes the development and unity of themes throughout Scripture that is ultimately climaxed in Jesus the Messiah as one whose life and ministry embodies the in-breaking of the eschatological kingdom of God.

This reading assumes an organic unity within the story of God and within the canon itself; it is a canonical reading of the text.  It is not a unity that undermines diversity within the canon, but recognizes a unity that moves throughout the theodrama towards its climax. Practioners of the scholarly historical-grammatical method sometimes do not recognize this unity.  But reading Scripture in a redemptive-historical way unveils a Christological unity to the theodrama.

C. Forms of Theological Expression. Within the Reformed and Stone-Campbell traditions, CEI (command, example and inference) has often been the primary way of categorizing the modes by which Scripture “authorizes” something. It is the way “legal authority” is bestowed upon potential ecclesiological practices.

Categorizations are often helpful and CEI should not be dismissed simply because it is not found exactly in that form within the text of Scripture. What is crucial, however, is that we observe how biblical authors themselves utilize or assume these forms (or categories) for the purpose for which we ourselves claim to use them. This is when it becomes difficult. Without arguing the case in any detail here, I would suggest that there are multiple ways of categorizing such forms and the form “command, example and inference” is not necessarily a bad one in itself. There is no single way to do it and to some extent they all overlap with each other.  The primary issue is how we use them, for what purpose we use them, and the fundamental frame in which we use them.

Since the discussion of CEI is complex (and I have already commented on how it has been used in the Stone-Campbell heritage in previous posts), I will not attempt a comment here. Rather, I would suggest another–more helpful, in my opinion–way of categorizing these uses in Scripture or, as I call them in the heading, “forms of theological expression.”  I find Richard Hays’ four-fold category in his Moral Vision of the New Testament more sensitive to the historical and redemptive-historical setting of Scripture. 

  1. Rules — explicit, direct commands or regulations that particular expressions of a principle.  Examples: “Command those who are rich…to be generous and willing to share” (1 Timothy 6:17-18 ) or “Sell your possessions and give to the poor” (Luke 12:33a).
  2. Principles – general considerations by which particular decision are to be governed.  Example: “…work, doing something useful with his own hands, that he may have something to share with those in need” (Ephesians 4:28).
  3. Paradigms — stories which model conduct or embody the principles in particular ways. Example: “All the believers were together and had everything in common.  Selling their possessions and goods, they gave to anyone as he had neeed” (Acts 2:44-45).
  4. Symbolic World –the metanarrative which creates the perceptual categories through which reality is interpreted. Example: “Thanks be to God for his indescribable gift” (2 Corinthians 9:15).

When we read Scripture, I think it is legitimate to note these forms of expression as ways of guiding our application of the story of God in our own lives.  They provide guidelines for participating in the theodrama. They are not legal categories to be collated through the lens of a legal brief and then placed into syllogisms to construct a legal blueprint (which is the way CEI has often been used in the Stone-Campbell Movement). Rather, they are scripts of previous acts in the drama that give us direction for living out the script of God’s drama in the 21st century.

What is extremely significant is that each of these forms of theological expression are embedded in particular contexts and thus must be read in a grammatical-historical way.  Further, each of these forms are part of a canonical context (or, redemptive-historical context) and thus must be read in a way that reflects the dynamics of biblical theology. They must not be extracted from their literary and/or canonical contexts in order to construct an system that is extraneous to the metanarrative itself.

For example, commands exist within the nexus of redemptive-history (canonical flow), historical context and specific application. We do not usually think of the commands on a one-to-one equivalency with our own context. We do not practice everything the early church did in exactly the way they did (e.g., one loaf on the table). Rather, through these forms of theological expression we discern what is utilized within the theodrama that warrants a recontextualization of the command to our setting. Paradigms provide an illustration of the principles or an occasion for the implementation of the rule (command) while the Symbolic World provides the theological frame that gives meaning and significance to the rule, principle and paradigm.  Ultimately, it is the Symbolic World that suggests the normativity for recontextualization. The theodrama itself drives us to participation in the story as the rules, priniciples and paradigms guide us in living out that story.

By prioritizing the theodrama (metanarrative or Symbolic World), we provide a check against isolated and abstracted deductions (e.g., a church youth group cannot raise money for the poor through a car wash on church property) or the exaltation of rules to the level of a proof-text (e.g., footwashing in John 13). One way in which the metanarrative or Symbolic World should have regulated our incessant–and perhaps, given the hermeneutic used,  sound–inferences is the conclusion that churches cannot use money from their treasuries to help non-Christians. It seems to me, in light of the metanarrative, this is an absurd conclusion.  God gives to non-Christians all the time; he gave his Son for sinners. The whole theodrama is the gracious gift of God to his rebellious world, even while they were yet enemies.  The metanarrative should have, I think, checked our hermeneutic.  If our hermeneutic legitimately concludes that churches should not help non-Christian poor and the metanarrative shows God’s preference for the poor as well as his gifts to his enemies, then there is something seriously wrong with the hermeneutic itself!

The metanarrative or Symbolic World must judge our hermeneutical inferences, applications of commands (rules) and conclusions.

Step Three: Theological Centers as Normative.

At this point the call is to explore and reflect on what the text affirms, the redemptive-historical location and movement within the text, and the forms of theological expression present through the lens of the centers of biblical theology. Normativity, I believe, is located in these theological centers. In other words, how we live out the story of God in the present is guided by the centers of biblical theology as given to us in the textual affirmations, redemptive-historical locations, and forms of theological expression. It is the theological centers that ground our faith and practice in something more than ancient culture.

In the previous two posts in this series I have suggested that our fundamental lens for understanding and appropriating biblical theology is the Christ Event.  At this point, as a complementary but different angle on the same point, I want to suggest a four-fold lens. 

The function of the lens is to embrace a vision of the character of God revealed through the theodrama. Consequently, it is a theocentric focus–it is to the praise and glory of God.  At the same time, it is also Christocentric as the means for knowing God since he reveals himself in Jesus and the Incarnate One “exegetes” the Father (John 1:18). Jesus, as the image of God, is the embodiment of the character of God and  pursues the mission of God. The lens, then, points to the character and mission of God as it is revealed in the Christ Event. Another way of saying that is with a 4-Cs:  Creation, Community, Christ, and Consummation. There are, of course, other ways of saying this, but this is a good pedagogical handle for me–and the aliteration helps too. :-)

  1. Creation-the divine intent. God created community, intended humanity represent (image) him in the world, and to fill the earth with his glory (humans who image him in caring for the cosmos).
  2. Community–whether in Israel or the Church, God intended a kind of community where there are no poor or needy; a community that shared life together and shared the task of imaging God in the world, a redemptive community in a fallen world. Through Scripture–through his messengers, prophets, etc.–God seels to shape his community into that redemptive community that bears his image.
  3. Christ–God entered the world as flesh and lived among us. He is the image of God; he is the true human just as he is truly (authentically) human. He is what humans are supposed to be in a fallen world. His ministry is the ministry of true humans. The incarnation answers the question what would God do if he were one of us.
  4. Consummation (New Creation)–the divine goal. What is God’s kingdom climax? This is the world that God will ultimately recreate. It is the kind of world that should intrude into the present–the eschatological reality should be present in the church. The church should be shaped by the divine eschatological goal.

At the center of these themes is imaging (imitating) God which we discern through following Jesus and practicing the kingdom of God which has already arrived in the community of disciples.

Conclusion

I know I have left this “hanging” a bit. I have not yet illustrated the method or brought it to bear on historic issues in the Stone-Campbell Movement.  But this post is already too long (over 2500 words) and so I will have to pursue the illustrations and applications in another post (or series).

Patience, my friends.  :-)   Besides, I have to figure where I have left myself in this mess.  If you’re confused, take heart–so am I.  :-)


Stone-Campbell Hermeneutics VI — Appreciation and Critique

June 1, 2008

In this last post for this series (link to the first post here) I attempt to offer a balanced–both appreciative and critical–perspective on the hermeneutic that has dominated Churches of Christ for most of their history. It was only in the 1960s that this dominance began to crack as journals like Restoration Quarterly and Mission offered critiques and as individuals like Carl Ketcherside (see Twisted Scriptures and According to the Pattern) and others punched holes in it by pointing to its inconsistencies.

Ultimately, however, I believe the hermeneutic basically imploded under the weight of the institutional controversy.  It appeared to many that the noninstitutional advocates were rigorously and as consistently as possible applying the hermeneutic but their own biblical-theological instincts could not agree with some of the noninstitutional conclusions (e.g., refusal to use money from the church treasury to help the unbelieving poor). The hermeneutic led to another division which disillusioned some and emboldened them to seek a different hermeneutical path.

At the same time a renewed sense of the historical meaning of the text and a return to a more rigorous historical-grammatical reading called into question some of the cherished understandings of particular texts.  For example, is 1 Corinthians 16:1-2 intended as a normative pattern for every first day of the week free-will offerings by every faithful congregation of Christ throughout the history of the church or is it simply Paul’s arrangement to facilitate the contribution by the Galatians and Corinthians to the Jerusalem church? A return to the historical/contextual sense of the text raised questions about the conclusions of the “system” generated by a Baconian induction-deduction.

This hermeneutical discontent led to the discussion of the “New Hermeneutic” in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But more about that in my next series to begin in a few days, Lord willing. For now I want to express appreciation for and offers some critique of the traditional Stone-Campbell hermeneutic.

Appreciation

My previous engagement with the traditional hermeneutic has probably failed to reflect how truly appreciative I am of its positive dimensions. I want to remedy that now.

1.  History.  I appreciate Campbell’s original intent to approach the text in a historical rather than scholastic fashion. Campbell reminded us that Scripture is primarily (4/5ths) history and that Scripture is itself part of history. Consequently, it must be read as any other human book that is written in human language by humans for humans. The historical character of Scripture and its historical situatedness must fundamentally shape how we read it. As a result, Campbell embraced the historical-grammatical method in contrast to the more scholastic and syllogistic methods of some of his fore-bearers and contemporaries.

2.  Induction. I appreciate that an inductive reading of Scripture is the beginning point of the hermeneutic. The Stone-Campbell Movement has always emphasized reading the Bible and the hermeneutical method has always emphasized an openness to the inductive “facts” of Scripture. Part of this commitment is to begin with Scripture rather than with tradition or a creedal commitment, and that part of this commitment is to remain open to the inductive reshaping of our hearts and minds by what Scripture teaches rather than remaining entrenched in some traditional notions because that is the way we have always believed or that is the tradition in which we were raised. It has not always worked that way as is true of all human beings, but it is the commitment of the method to seek an openness to the text through induction.

3.  Rational. I appreciate Campbell’s original intent and the continued emphasis in the movement to use the divine gift of human reason to understand Scripture. Their opposition to “mystical” or “enthusiast” readings of Scripture is important. They, of course, still practiced a devotional or sanctifying reading of Scripture but the interpretation of Scripture is mediated through the rational understanding of the words of the text rather than through subjective revelations or “inner light”. The text functioned as an objective boundary for meaning that could not be contravened by some “inner light.” And, yet, at the same time, through reading Scripture we “feel” after God and encounter him in sanctifying ways, even mystical ways. But these are part of the process and are acceptable as long as they do not violate the boundaries of text’s meaning just as our empirical experience of the world (‘there is a tree in my front yard”) should not be overruled by some subjective or mystical denial of our experience (“there is no tree in my front yard” when empirically there is one). The use of reason, then, is a positive dimension of the Stone-Cambpell hermeneutic. It becomes problematic, however, when we absolutize human reason and believe that human inferences are more significant and more binding than the contextual, historical statements of the text itself.

4.  Sola Scriptura. I appreciate the central place that Scripture has in the Stone-Campbell hermeneutic. Sola Scriptura as a slogan is subject to a range of interpretations–many of which I would not accept. What I mean by the phrase is that Scripture is the “norming norm” (as Grenz, Franke, Vanhoozer among others tend to say) as opposed to other norms such as tradition or existential experience or even the living community of faith or some kind of paleo-orthodoxy. I will explain this more in subsequent posts, but suffice it to say at this point that I think a value of the Stone-Campbell hermeneutic is the priority of the text of Scripture as a word from God. Scripture is the ultimate standard for interpreting the world, discerning good from evil, and shaping the people of God into a community of faith.

5.  Goal. I appreciate the original goal which Campbell’s new hermeneutic served. His intent was to provide a hermeneutical means by which people could find common ground or unity. His vision was not a uniformity based on his undestanding of the “ancient order,” but it was a unity that shared a common faith in Jesus and a common apostolic practice. These, according to Campbell, were explicit in the text and they were rather minimal (e.g., one fact, one act [immersion], and one day [assembling] in conjunction with a Christian character).

Critique

Embedded in my descriptions over the past five posts are some significant criticisms.  I will not repeat them all here. Instead I will summarize some of the major problems of the traditional hermeneutic in several categories. Each of these could be considerably expanded (or perhaps a whole boring series devoted to them).

1.  Enligtenment Hermeneutical Assumptions.   The optimism of the Campbell’s hermeneutic imbibes the optimism of the Enlightenment Age and the progress of Baconian science.  If everyone uses the same hermeneutic, then everyone will come to the same conclusions.  The postmodern situation highlights that this optimism is deeply flawed because there is more to the hermeneutical process than the “objectivity” of the observer.  Challenging some of these “modern” assumptions was the point of my recent series entitled “Created for Hermeneutics” (click here for the first post in that series). Another Enlightenment hermeneutical assumption germane to the Baconian project is that there are such things as ”uninterpreted facts” (or, brute facts, or a facts that needs no interpretation). Indeed, it was a common maxium within some quarters of the Stone-Campbell heritage that the “Bible needs no interpretation.” This assumption can generate either naivete (interpreters do not recognize their own situatedness) or arrogance (“if you can’t see it the way I see it then something is wrong with you”) or both. That assumption is that we can remain fundamentally objective in our reading of Scripture as if we are unaffected by our situatedness. There are other assumptions, but these are sufficient–I hope–to make my point.

2.  Baconian Induction of ‘Facts’. While induction is a necessary tool in the study of Scripture, Baconian induction tends to override the historical and contextual character of Scripture itself. This form of induction isolates the “facts” of the text and decontextualizes them by extracting “timeless” propositions which take on a new meaning as we put them into a different context than the narrative flow of Scripture itself. When we isolate “facts” we distort them. When we take a “fact” out of its context and place it in a syllogism, we give it a new context. This naturally distorts the meaning and this enables us to more easily manipulate the “fact” to our own interest or agenda–and this often happens unconsciously, that is, we think we are simply teaching “straight biblical truth”! This is not only a form of proof-texting but it is unfaithful to the narrative nature of Scripture itself whose “facts” are embedded within an interpretative matrix. Extracting them, propositionalizing them in the abstract, and then using them as part of a polemic for the sake of the perceived “system” is an abuse of Scripture. It twists and distorts the meaning of Scripture.

3.  Ahistorical and Atraditional Reading of Scripture. It was a common maxim, inaugurated by Campbell himself, to value reading the Bible as if one has never read it before; to read the Bible with a “blank slate” (a Lockean tabula rasa). Supposedly, if people would read Scripture disconnected from their own historical situatedness, disconnected from their tradition, and disconnected from others, then the pure message of Scripture would be objectively written on their minds. But this is a myth; it can’t be done. Further, I am sure that it should not be done.  Why should I read Scripture forgetting all that I have already read in Scripture? It is rather aroggant, I think, to read Scripture disconnected from community (the living community as well as the past community of interpreters). We learn from others–past and present, and we hear Scripture more clearly in community than as individuals. The Baconian method, however, extracts Scripture from its historical context, from the living tradition of the church and from the living community of faith to read it as a scientific, objective, even individualistic enterprise. It propositionalizes the text by isolating its teachings and divorces them from its own context and history as well as divorcing the process from listening to the traditions of the church. Certainly not all traditions are equal nor is the living community always headed in a good direction, but our individualism and supposed objectivity (thinking history does not affect us in our reading) will render us susceptible to isolationism, arrogance and self-deception. This end result is a natural consequence of the presuppositions and functioning of the hermeneutic.

4.  Dependence on Inference and “Common Sense” as Hermeneutical Hinges to Determine Authority. One of the basic problems with CEI is that ultimately it all comes down to “I”.  Binding examples are recognized by an implied command. Without inferring that a command lies behind the example, then the example is not binding. Binding examples are implied commands! It all depends on the inference. So, for example, we know–according to the hermeneutic–that the first day of the week is the exclusive day for the Lord’s Supper because there is an implied command to eat the Lord’s Supper and God would not command us to do something like that without telling us when to do it.  Consequently, the practice of the church in Troas in Acts 20:7 becomes a binding example because we know that God  must have commanded to eat on that day and only on that day since God must tell us somewhere in the New Testament (somewhere in the constitution) when to eat the Lord’s Supper. But we also know that it is not necessary to eat in an upper room or only at night (even though those are the only circumstances of eating the Supper we have in the New Testament–even Jesus himself ate at night in the upper room, but he does not count since it was before Pentecost anyway) because there is no implied command.  How do we know the difference between whether there is an implied command or not?  It seems it is either another inference (like “God would surely tell us about X”) or “common sense” (any person with a “good heart” can see the difference). Inference also shapes how we understand the silence of Scripture.  It is not mere silence alone that prohibits, but silence plus an inference of some kind. Silence is prohibitive if we infer that the silence is intentional. Or the silence is prohibitive if we determine that the silence of Scripture regarding coordinates to explicit commands is intended to exclude (e.g., the coordinate of instrumental music to vocal music). The “law of exclusion” is itself an inference! And further it is not Scripture that defines coordinates–that is determined by human wisdom and inference as well…or by “common sense.”  Of course, inferences are not necessarily bad; indeed, they are necessary.  But the problem here is that inference becomes the centerpiece of “legal authority” rather than the explicit statements of Scripture. In the traditional Stone-Campbell hermeneutic they are the hinge that determines almost everything regarding authorization. Authority ultimately depends, then, not on divine statements but human inferences about divine statements.  It is little wonder we have fussed about so many things in our history because all the fuss is about human inferences. And all inferences, according to Alexander Campbell, are opinions rather than matters of faith.

5.  Ill-Suited to the Nature of Scripture. In the resources I have provided a link to Russ Dudrey’s Restoration Quarterly article which makes this point. What the Baconian hermeneutic plus a constitutional patternism seeks from Scripture belongs to a different genre of literature than is present in the New Testament. If Campbell was correct that we should read Scripture as it was given to us in human language for humans written by humans, then we must respect the nature of the literary genre in which Scripture presents itself to us.  And the New Testament does not present itself as a legal brief or a legal constitution but as theologial biography, theological history, missional letters and apocalyptic vision. None of these should be read as legal texts with legal precision and a legal hermeneutic ill-suited for them. As Dudrey writes, “We must develop a literary model and a hermeneutic more truly suited to the nature of our texts.”  If we would be faithful to the God of Scripture, then we must read Scripture as God gave it to us rather than frame our reading in some kind of Baconian/American/Puritan mold. Dudrey suggests–and it is not a bad suggestion–that we read “first as historians, then as missionaries, then as theologians.” And…I would add…never as lawyers. (Interestingly lawyers excelled at reading the New Tesament through the traditional hermeneutic in mid-twentieth century Churches of Christ, e.g., the several institutional-noninstitutional debates between Guy N. Woods and Roy E. Cogdill–both were lawyers and neither could agree withthe other!). Someone might object that it is God as king who is the single author of the New Testament and his written his law into the New Testament. But that is not the genre in which God has revealed his will for us.  Rather, God revealed himself through the genres present in the New Testament and intended them (as Campbell argued) to be read as one human conversing with another human.  That is, we read the New Testament as is–in its own genre and literary style because this is how God has revealed his word to us.  To read it as a legal brief or constitution is to read it in a different way than how God gave it to us. This is fundamentally unfaithful to Scripture.

6.  System Prioritized Over Context. Given the Baconian induction of facts that must be collated and systematized, the system attains a weight of authority that in practice stands above Scripture. So, for example, Acts 2:46 cannot mean that the Jerusalem believers ate the Supper daily because the system has already concluded (through example and inference; through induction-deduction) that only Sunday is authorized for such. Unfortunately, the induction excluded a contextual reading of Acts 2:46 and forced upon it a meaning previously determined by the system. Another example among some noninstitutionalists is the refusal to use the church’s treasury to help the nonChristian poor. The inductive-deductive system here yields a conclusion that is manifestly in opposition to God’s own heart who gave his Son for his enemies. It seems to me that if the Lord gave his Son for his enemies he would not mind using his money to help the poor who do not yet know him.  These are but two examples that could be multiplied. The system consistently overrides a historical, contextual reading of the text and sometimes the basic theology of the narrative.  Of course, this can happen in any hermeneutic, but it is highly problematic here because of the nature of Baconian induction-deduction with its Enlightenment assumptions and American constitutional model.

7. Constitutional Literary Model. Campbell used the metaphor of “constitution” because it was certainly a live metaphor with the recent birth of United States Constitution in 1787 and because it was the language Presbyterians (and others) used to describe their creeds. His use of the metaphor had a polemical point–his constitution is the Bible (specifically the New Testament) while others identified their creeds as constitutions.  However, this metaphor also became a hermeneutical model rather than just a polemical retort. As a hermeneutical model, it is woefully inadequate since the documents of the New Testament nowhere near approximate the literary function of a constitution. A particular variety of “patternism” emerged out of the combination of the Baconian method with a constitutional literary model plus Reformed Puritan primitivism–it is the “blueprint” or “pattern” mentality with which most members of the Churches of Christ imbibed throughout the early and mid-20th century. It turns the Bible, particularly the New Testament, into something it is not and thus reads it for information which it never intended to yield. It attached to the New Testament an authority of silence that is more rooted in the constitutional model than the genre of New Testament documents.

 Patternism and the Text: How Shall We Hermeneutically Construe the “Pattern”?

Recent and historic discussions within Churches of Christ have not generally been about whether there is a pattern, but what kind of pattern, how does one discern the pattern, how detailed is the pattern, and what belongs to the pattern. Risking oversimplification and generalization, I suggest that three types of “patternism” have been operative at one time or another in the conservative regions of the Stone-Campbell Movement.

Historical: The goal is to reduplicatethe church as it exists within the New Testament documents. The source of this pattern is the explicit historical witness of the documents (command or example). The pattern only exists in the explicit testimony of the documents. The pattern is historical in character. The mantra “it is safe to do what they did” fits this method. This is essentially Alexander Campbell’s intent though I recognize I have oversimplified what he is doing hermeneutically.

Constructed: The goal is to construct a pattern out of the data of the New Testament because the text itself neither explicitly details a pattern for the church nor provides a specific blueprint. Building on historical patternism, data from the New Testament is collected, collated, harmonized, systematized and arranged in its proper order to fully detail the pattern because there are implicit as well explicit particulars to the pattern. The pattern is the result of a systematic analysis of the data in the whole NT; it is a form of system-building. It is temple-building. This is essentially Lamar’s intent and was adopted by Churches of Christ throughout most of the last 150 years.

Theological: The goal is to explore the story of God in such a way as to participate in it. Rather than building a temple, this method explores the temple (Scripture) God has given in order to imbibe his mission. The pattern for the church is the redemptive work of God in history through Jesus Christ. The New Testament (in continuity with the Old Testament and only fully understood in light of the Old Testament) is a historical record of the mighty acts of God which call us to imitate God’s work in Jesus. The pattern is Christological in character and as disciples we follow Jesus in order to participate in God’s mission in the world.

I think the first (historical) is too naive–no one does exactly what the churches of the New Testament did and we all recognize that some things the churches of the New Testament practiced we don’t practice.  The second (constructed) is too complicated, too dependent on human constructs (systems), and expects something from Scripture that does not fit the nature of Scripture itself.  The third (theological)–well–that is the topic of my next hermeneutical series.  I will begin that series in a few days, Lord willing.

Conclusion

I have not, of course, noted every possible appreciation or critique.  But these are the ones that have risen to the top of my mind on this day. There are many sub-issues that could be pursued.  For example, the nature and function of silence as prohibitive, permissive or incidental is something I have not discussed–perhaps another day. And there are others as well.

Nevertheless, I hope this gives sufficient pause to the wholesale rejection as well adoption of the traditional Stone-Campbell hermeneutic as utilized by Churches of Christ for most of the 20th century. I would not want to throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater but neither would I want to steal another’s baby and assume it came from God.

Resources

Roy E. Ward. “‘The Restoration Principle’: A Critical Analysis.Restoration Quarterly 8.4 (1965), 197-210.

Russ Dudrey. “Restorationist Hermeneutics Among the Churches of Christ: Why Are We at an Impasse?Restoration Quarterly 30.1 (1988), 17-42.

Gary D. Collier, “Bringing the Word to Life: Biblical Hermeneutics in Churches of Christ.” Christian Studies 11.1 (1990), 18-40.

John Dobbs. “Finding Peace in the Hermeneutic Wars Within Churches of Christ.“  This is for you Mr. Dobbs! :-) I bet you didn’t know I knew about this article. :-)


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